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This article explores discourses and practices of crisis recovery from a cultural political 
economy (hereafter CPE) perspective. Many recent accounts of ‘crisis recovery’ and the 
imaginaries on which they draw are national- and state-focused, especially when referring to 
government stimulus or austerity packages. In contrast, this article employs CPE to redirect 
attention to the imaginaries used by (trans-)national and/or intergovernmental forces in 
identifying and promoting another road to recovery. Specifically, it focuses on how entities 
such as international investment banks, economic strategists, international organizations, 
think tanks, intergovernmental agencies, and business media, have (re-) imagined the role of 
the ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) economies as drivers of recovery in the context of 
financial crises in the USA and Europe. The article has five parts. Part one briefly addresses 
the rapidly developing literature on ‘cultural economy’ and the ways in which the proposed 
CPE approach can add to a micro-macro understanding of (financial) (dis-)orders. Part two 
applies this approach to the roles of nodal (trans-)national forces in making, negotiating and 
circulating ‘BRIC’ as an economic imaginary. It argues that this involves constructions of 
‘hope’/‘strength’ in three overlapping moments: an investor narrative, then an investor-
consumer tale, and, since 2009, an investor-consumer-lender story. The changing BRIC 
imaginary has both transnational and national significance and its resonance depends not only 
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on developments in the ‘financial’ and ‘real’ economies but also on specific discourses, 
practices, and knowledge technologies. Part three addresses the structural/material contexts in 
which the BRIC discourses were popularized by private and public sector actors in response 
to the continuing financial crisis that became visible in 2007. In this conjuncture, the BRIC 
economies were identified as sites that could facilitate ‘economic recovery’. This imagined 
recovery was made more credible when the BRIC countries developed their own stimulus 
packages. China was seen as leader of the pack here and its large national package was 
described by one international economist (Lardy) as ‘gold standard’ (see below). Part four 
examines how this package intensified some deep-rooted tensions in central-local relations. 
More specifically, it posed tremendous fiscal challenges for local authorities, which rely 
heavily on land as a source of revenue and mortgage loans. The resulting intensified 
commodification of land has further inflated the ‘property bubble’ and stimulated more land 
dispossession/grabbing. This harms China’s subaltern groups in various ways, illustrated 
below by the cases of ‘house slaves’ and the plight of migrant workers’ children. Though 
some measures have been taken to dampen the property market, their impact has been limited 
and social unrest continues. Part five comments on CPE’s contribution to understanding the 
micro-power relations involved in constructing hope as well as on some macro-structural 
issues involved in attempts to stimulate recovery. 
 
2. Towards a Cultural Political Economy of Imagined Recovery 
CPE partly overlaps with the rapidly-developing literature on ‘cultural economy’ found in the 
work of Callon (1988), MacKenzie et al (2007), Pryke and du Gay (2007), and others. Their 
post-structural concern with the cultural orderings of the economy highlights the importance 
of micro-level devices in (re-)producing market knowledge and the performative effects of 
economic imaginaries in creating/changing subjectivities. The emphasis on ‘how’ knowledge 
is created and performed in the market and reaches into everyday life has gained much 
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academic attention. Regarding financialization, for example, studies include: (a) knowledging 
technologies in identifying, calculating and marketing risk as profit (e.g., de Goede 2004); (b) 
the performative qualities of financial theories and calculating techniques such as the Black-
Scholes model in constituting and altering markets and market behaviour (e.g., MacKenzie 
2004 and 2006); and (c) the construction and cultivation of financial subjects and agency 
(e.g., Aitken 2007). 
 
While this literature has advanced understanding of the micro-foundations and technologies 
in building (financial) markets, it has been criticized for reinforcing and reifying the power of 
rational calculation as articulated by neoclassical economics and for downplaying the 
political nature of the market (see the criticisms in Slater 2002; Pryke and du Gay 2007; 
Montgomerie 2008). This critique is reiterated by Paterson who, with Best (2010), promoted 
‘cultural political economy’ as a ‘field of study’ that seeks to bring politics into the cultural 
economy literature (Descheneau and Paterson 2012: 67). This contribution is useful in its 
own terms but can add little to ‘cultural economy’ or ‘political economy’ more generally 
unless more is said on: (a) the processes and mechanisms of politicization; (b) the role of 
power relations, especially in privileged sites of capital accumulation, in framing discourses; 
(c) the role of nodal discursive networks in shaping and being shaped by (financial) market 
building; (d) the intertwining of the macro-structural imperatives of global capitalism, 
economic narratives and more micro-social relations; and (e) the interaction between material 
structure and agencies in uneven and contested remaking of social relations. In this regard, 
the CPE approach developed here (as opposed to ‘cultural political economy’ as a broad field 
of study à la Best and Paterson) explores the micro-macro interface between the discursive 
and material moments involved in reproducing and remaking capitalism (Sum 2005, Jessop 




Accordingly, this theoretical agenda highlights the articulation of the more discursive 
moments (including subjectivities, identities, economic and political categories, knowledge 
production, modes of calculation, and structures of feeling) of economic-political relations as 
well as their structural features (including social forms, their institutional mediations, 
contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and class relations). These discursive-material interactions 
become more visible during crisis conjunctures when sedimented social relations are re-
politicized. Actors seek to interpret the crisis as a basis for crisis management and/or 
recovery, including developing and justifying stimulus packages, austerity programmes, new 
investment sites, etc. This article applies CPE to the emergence of the ‘BRIC’ imaginary as a 
possible new path towards crisis recovery. As objects of ‘hope’/’strength’, the BRIC quartet 
were imagined in three overlapping moments. It was first identified during the post-9/11 
security crisis in 2001 and, in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, it has been re-imagined as 
well as translated into different rationalities and material practices. This has involved what 
neo-Foucauldians call knowledging technologies (Dean 1999; Miller and Rose 2008) as well 
as processes of selection, recontextualization, circulation and sedimentation. 
 
The CPE approach proposed here examines not only ‘how’ knowledge is constructed; but 
also investigates ‘when’, ‘who’, and ‘what’ issues. These questions point beyond discursive 
technologies to the role of nodal discursive networks of individual and institutional actors in 
remaking social relations. For present purposes, this agenda can be re-specified as follows: 
(1) when does a particular economic imaginary (e.g., BRIC) and its related discursive 
networks begin to gain credence; (2) who gets involved in the discursive networks that 
construct and promote objects of ‘hope’/‘strength’; (3) what additional ideas and practices are 
selected and drawn upon to recontextualize and hybridize the referents of these objects; (4) 
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what governmental knowledging technologies are involved in constituting subjectivities and 
identities; (5) how do these imaginaries, subjectivities, and identities become normalized, 
translated and negotiated and, in particular, how do they change everyday financial practices 
or enter the policy field; (6) how far and in what ways do these changes have uneven impacts 
across different sites and scales (e.g., the lives of subaltern groups); and (7) how are they 
being negotiated and/or resisted in the rebuilding of social relations?
1
 Adequate answers 
require attention to discourse, power and structural materialities. This article explores these 
questions through the case of the BRIC imaginary and its differential appropriation and 
uneven impact especially at local sites. 
 
3. The Construction of Hope/Strength: Three Moments in the Making of ‘BRIC’2 
 
‘BRIC’ discourse builds on the idea of ‘emerging markets’. This latter notion was coined in 
1981 by fund manager Antoine van Agtmael of Emerging Markets Management. It mapped 
selectively some large ‘Third World’ and post-socialist economies as sites of ‘new 
opportunities’ with ‘high risks’ but potentially high returns (Sidaway and Pryke 2000). 
‘BRIC’ is a subset of the ‘larger emerging markets’ and was identified by major investment 
banks and, later, international organizations as having high-growth potential and, hence, as a 
suitable target for increased investment after September 11 in 2001. As a set of hope 
imaginaries, it emerged through three overlapping moments, i.e., as an investor narrative, an 
investor-consumer tale, and, an investor-consumer-lender story. Shifting sets of nodal actors 
were involved at each moment as agents responded to new crisis symptoms emerged by 
elaborating new BRIC imaginaries. This involved the production of BRIC knowledge based 
on micro-level instruments (e.g., reports, books, and investment funds) and governing 
technologies and was oriented to creating new capacities for individual and collective action. 
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Inspired by affect studies (e.g., Massumi n.d.; Connolly 2002), Chaput reads such rhetorical 
moments as discursive spaces that are shot through with the affective energy of capitalism. 
This energizes common-sense beliefs and means that individual and collective decisions are 
not governed purely by rational calculation about self-interest but are also emotionally 
charged (Chaput 2010: 4-8).
3
 This casts interesting light on the role of the BRIC imaginaries 
in framing, energizing, and governing the desires and strategies of crisis recovery. 
Table 1 The Production of ‘Hope’/’Strength’: Three Overlapping Moments in the 
Production of ‘BRIC’ Knowledge 












banks (e.g., Goldman 
Sachs) 
Chief Economist (e.g., 
Jim O’Neill) & 
colleagues; fund 
managers, sales teams, 
financial journalists, 
rating agency, etc. 
 2001 Invented the 
category in the report on 
Building Better Global 
Economic BRICs 
 2003 Research report on 
‘Dreaming with BRICs: 
The Path to 2050‘ 
 Other reports, books, 
webtours, indexes, etc. 
(see also table 2) 
 BRIC investment funds 





















media (Bloomberg, The 
Economist, CNN, blogs, 
etc.), international 
organizations (e.g., World 
Bank, IMF) 
 Decoupling theses 
 (The trans-Atlantic 
economies are in 
recession due to the 
subprime crisis and its 
fallout. Other regions, 
especially the BRIC, 
continue to grow during 
this downturn – strong 
consumption) 











organizations (WB, IMF, 
G20, BRIC Summits, 
etc.), national leaders, 
foreign policy analysts 
and mass media 
 Subscribing to IMF 
Special Drawing Rights 
(e.g., USD 50 bn by 
China in 04/09/09) 
 Shifting global economic 
and political governance 





lender story from G8 to G20)  
 
(Source: Author’s own compilation) 
 
3.1 First moment in the BRIC imaginary, 2001- present: investor story 
Contrary to the fuzzy origins of most discursive objects, the BRIC idea has a clear starting 
point. It began with the invention of the idea of ‘BRIC’ by a major investment bank -- 
Goldman Sachs. Influenced by the security crisis of 9/11 and China’s entrance into the WTO 
in 2001, Jim O’Neill, then Goldman Sachs’ Chief Economist, interpreted the destruction of 
the World Trade Centre as signifying that further progress in globalization could no longer 
rely on US leadership and, indeed, must look beyond the northern-western world (Tett 2010). 
This diagnosis of the demise of American dominance and the emergence of global China (and 
other emerging markets) prompted the Goldman team to identify some useful ‘non-western 
others’ with high growth potential. By 30 November 2001, these ‘others’ were baptised as the 
‘BRIC’ in Goldman Sachs Global Economic Paper No. 66, which was titled Building Better 
Global Economic Brics. 
 
Based on a mathematized model on demographic trends and productivity rates, it forecast 
their combined GDP growth rates would range between 9 to 14 percent in 2010. This new 
body of knowledge identified and constructed BRIC as a complementary group of economies 
that is ‘set to grow again by more than the G7’ (Goldman Sachs 2001: S.03). Within this 
group, while China and India were seen as having higher growth rates and emerging as 
dominant global suppliers of manufactured goods and services, Brazil and Russia would 




The creation of BRIC as a distinct site for investors initially met with mixed reactions.  While 
Goldman Sachs’ corporate clients, who were seeking new markets, liked this construction, 
banks and investors were more sceptical as the BRIC were deemed vulnerable to political 
upheavals and falling commodity prices. Nonetheless, O’Neill’s team continued to supply 
their clients with ‘hope’ based on expectations of high investment returns. In a 2003 report, 
Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, two other economists in his team framed BRIC 
economic dynamics in terms of growth paths spurred by ‘ingredients’ such as sound 
macroeconomic policies, low inflation, openness to trade and high levels of education 
(O’Neill 2012: 34-5).4 The team forecast that, by 2050, the BRIC would catch up and become 
‘emerged’ economies. By then, China's gross domestic product could be 30 per cent larger 
than that of the US; India's could be four times that of Japan; and the figures for Brazil and 
Russia could be at least 50 per cent bigger than UK GDP. For the team, such achievements 
would rebalance the world economy with the BRICs’ growth offsetting ‘the impact of 
greying populations and slower growth in the advanced economies’ (Wilson and 
Purushothaman 2003:2). 
 
References to catch-up and prospective performance can be seen, in neo-Foucauldian terms, 
as technologies of identification and achievement in which the BRIC quartet is singled out, 
made knowable, and visibilized as a coherent set of ‘emerging’ economies embarking on 
high-growth paths with great potential for long-term investors (see table 1). These two 
knowledging technologies supported the ‘sales pitch’ of Goldman Sachs and other fund 
managers and financial sales teams, and thereby facilitated the circulation of BRIC as a new 
‘dream’ in this nodal investment network. As neoliberal globalization was consolidated (in 
part with China’s entry into the WTO), more and more corporations and financial 
organizations were scoping new markets and profitable investment sites. New discursive 
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networks, which included corporate executives, investment bankers, fund managers, etc., 
began to endorse and reinforce the BRIC imaginary as a desirable object of investment and 
strategic actions. After the 2003 paper, Goldman economists entered what O’Neill described 
as ‘briclife’ (Tett 2010) as clients (e.g., Vodafone, BHP Billiton, IKEA and Nissan) swamped 
their daily routines with enquiries.  Indeed, some clients not only imbibed but also actively 
promoted the BRIC KoolAid as a refreshing object of investment hope and actions. The 
Goldman team kept this affective space alive by churning out more knowledge products. 
Between 2001 and 2012, to keep ‘briclife’ going5, it created 21 such products, including 
reports, fresh forecasts, books, videos, and webtours (in different languages) to inspire hope 
(see table 2).  
 
 
Table 2  Major BRIC Knowledge Products Constructed by O’Neill and the  
Goldman Sachs Team 
 
Name of the 
Knowledge Products 
Nature of Product 
(Year/Month) 
Ways of Constructing Hope and 
Strength 
Building Better Global 
Economic BRICs  
Report 
November 2001  
 Invented the BRIC category 
 Outlining healthier outlook in BRIC 
with a forecast of 1.7% GDP growth 
rate 
Dreaming with BRICs: The 
Path to 2050 
Report 
October 2003  
 Mapping out BRIC’s GDP growth until 
2050 
 Postulating BRIC economies could be 
larger than G6 in 40 years’ time 
How Solid are the BRICs? 
Forecast 
December 2005  
 Updating the 2003 forecast 
 Arguing that BRIC grow more strongly 
than projection 
Web Tour: The BRICs 
Dream (in English, Arabic, 
Chinese and Japanese)  
Webtours 
May 2006  
 A video on the BRIC 
 Dreaming about BRIC and the 
changing world after 9/11 
 Contending China would overtake the 
USA in 2050 
 Arguing Growth of the middle classes 
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in BRIC and major consumers of cars 
and energies 
India’s urbanization: 
Emerging opportunities  
Report 
July 2007 
 Framing boom in city life 
 Identifying investment opportunities in 
urban infrastructure and fast 
accumulation of financial assets 
BRICS and Beyond 
Book 
November 2007  
 Updating the 2001 report 
 Postulating increase in value of BRIC’s 
equity markets 
 Moving beyond BRIC to other 
emerging economies (e.g., N-11) 
Interview with Jim O'Neill  
Video 
February 2008  
 Maintaining BRIC’s share of global 
GDP as 15% 
 Advising individual BRIC countries 
(e.g., India needs more FDI) 
 Arguing for the sustainability of BRIC 
 Increasing international role of these 
countries 




April 2008  
 Identifying increase demand for 
infrastructure 
 Arguing China will be the source of 
one-half to three-quarter of incremental 
demand 
 Intensifying pressure on commodity 
markets 
Ten Things for India to 
Achieve its 2050 Potential  
Report 
June 2008  
 Advising on improvement of 
governance and the need to control 
inflation 
 Promoting the liberalization of 
financial market 
 Supporting improvement for 
agricultural productivity 
BRICs Lead the Global 
Recovery 
Report 
May, 2009  
 Arguing BRIC can help to led the 
stabilization of the world economy 
 Promoting BRIC is one of the driving 
forces in the export-driven recovery 
The BRICs as Drivers of 
Global Consumption  
Report 
August 2009  
 Arguing G3 countries face slow and 
difficult recovery 
 Maintaining that BRIC can contribute 
to global domestic demand through 
higher consumption 
The BRICs Nifty 50: The 
EM & DM winners 
Report and stock baskets 
November 2009  
 Stating good consumption and 
infrastructural demand from BRIC 
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 Identifying two BRIC Nifty 50 baskets 
to help investors to access the BRIC 
market 
BRICs at 8: Strong through 




 BRIC weathered the global crisis 
remarkably well 
 On pace to equal the G7 in size by 
2032 
The Growth Map: Economic 
Opportunities of BRICs and 
Beyond 
Book 2012 
 A sole-authored book by O’Neill in 
reviewing the economic opportunities 
of BRIC and beyond 
 
(Source: Author’s own compilation based on materials from Goldman Sachs’ Idea Website on BRIC) 
 
The ‘BRIC’ imaginary continued to connect and circulate among economic strategists, 
investment consultants, and sales teams, etc. Its appeal derived not only from the projection 
of ‘hope’/’strength’ of the individual BRIC economies but also from their purported 
complementarity and profitability as an asset/investment group. Major international banks 
such as HSBC and other investment banks/hedge funds were bundling stocks/shares/bonds 
and inventing funds marketed new financial instruments under the BRIC brand, including 4-  
Year MYR HSBC BRIC Markets Structured Investment, Templeton BRIC Fund (Singapore), 
and the iShares MSCI BRIC Index Fund. In order to motivate investors, consultancies, such 
as Investment U (2009), narrated these funds as highly investable (see Table 3). Their 
investability was legitimated in terms of the financial good practices of the fund managers as 
well as the qualities of the BRIC economies. These practices included: (a) a good risk spread 
via a broad portfolio (e.g., the iShares MSCI BRIC Index Fund invested in 175 stocks); (b) the 
placement of funds in bigger BRIC economies, above all China/Hong Kong; (c) investment 
in giant companies operating in ‘strong’ lines of business (e.g., telecommunication, 
resources); and (d) strong profit forecasts based on technical criteria (reversion to a pre-crisis 
mean)  or the charismatic status of the ‘emerging market’ guru (Mark Mobius from 
Templeton) who managed one fund.. In neo-Foucauldian terms, this technology of 
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investability: (a) (b) normalizes the BRIC as investment sites in contrast to previous worried 
about risk; (b) identifies BRIC stocks as a novel, important and promising alternative asset 
class; ; and (c) encourages clients desirous of long-term, above-average profits to invest their 
money in these economies. 




Reasons for Choice Breakdown of 
ETF* by 
Country 
Top 10 Components 
Consist of Giant Firms 
iShares MSCI 
BRIC Index Fund 
First Choice 
A portfolio of about 175 stocks 
from the BRIC countries. 
Despite a gain in excess of 40% 
year-to-date, the fund is still 
down over 30% over the past 52 
weeks, so valuations are still 
not back to pre-crisis levels 
China and Hong 
Kong: 42%, 
Brazil: 32%, 
India: 13% and 
Russia: 13% 
China Mobile, Gazprom, 
Reliance Industry, Petrobras, 
Vale, Itau Unibanco, HDFC 
Bank, China Life Insurance, 
Lukoil, and Industrial & 





The fund is managed by 
emerging market guru, Mark 
Mobius. Mobius has been with 
the Templeton since 1987 and 
has blazed the trail for 
emerging markets investors 






Turkey and South 
Korea: 7% each 
Petrobras, Vale, Petrochina, 
Akbank, Denway Motors, 
Itau Unibanco, Sesa Goa, 
Banco Bradesco, Aluminum 
Corp of China and SK 
Energy 
(Source: Adapted from Invest U 2009 to fit a tabular form) 
 
Energetic financial sales teams and other intermediaries marketed these investment products 
to potential punters, reaching them through advertisements, glossy brochures, financial 
journalism, phone-calls, one-to-one meetings, etc.  Coupled with the general search for new 
investment sites and asset classes, the flow of portfolio equity funds into BRIC increased by 
almost twelvefold between 2002 and 2007. Relatedly, the BRIC had a two-thirds share of all 
investment in developing countries between 2003 and 2007 (see table 4). Within the BRIC 
group, China gained most in 2006 and India in 2007. In 2008, however, the global credit 
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crunch markedly slowed inflows to the BRIC, apart from China, which received US$ 3.7 
billion net. 
 
Table 4   Net Inflows of Portfolio Equity to the BRIC Economies 2002-2008 
($ billion) 
Country   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
China     2.2  7.7 10.9 20.3 42.9 18.5   3.7 
India     1.0  8.2   9.0 12.1   9.5  35.0 -15.0 
Brazil     2.0  3.0   2.1   6.5   7.7  26.2  -7.6 
Russia     2.6  0.4   0.2  -0.2   6.1  18.7 -15.0 
BRIC    7.8      19.3 22.2 38.7 66.2  98.4 -33.9 
Developing Countries  5.5      24.1 40.4 68.9   104.8 135.4 -57.1 
(Source: Adapted from World Bank, Global Development Finance 2008 and 2010) 
 
3.2 Second moment in the BRIC imaginary, 2004-present: investor-consumer story 
The BRIC story developed a consumption subplot from the mid-2000s. This was also started 
by the Goldman team, which published a report on The BRICs and Global Markets: Crude, 
Cars and Capital in 2004. It identified the increasing consumption potential of their 
‘emerging middle classes’, especially in terms of demand for commodities, consumer 
durables and capital services. This BRIC ‘dream’ was echoed by economic strategists such as 
Clyde Prestowitz. A former Reagan Administration official, Prestowitz relayed this ‘dream’ 
to a wider policy audience through his book, Three Billion New Capitalists, which projected 
that, by 2020, ‘… the annual increase in dollar spending by the BRIC will be twice that of the 




This BRIC-as-consumer story gained more weight as the financial crisis became visible with 
the collapse of the U.S. sub-prime market in 2007. The spread of wide and deep contagion 
effects energized the policy communities to seek new signs of ‘hope’ and objects of recovery. 
Amongst many such objects (e.g., Green New Deal), the pre-existing BRIC story was 
reworked to include a consumption dimension. This second moment in the BRIC imaginary 
(see table 1) attributed a new ‘locomotive role’ to the BRIC on the grounds that their 
consumer-led demand would defer recession and offer recovery possibilities for recession-
ridden advanced economies. 
 
This narrative was enthusiastically circulated by economists, (business) media (e.g., 
Bloomberg, Newsweek, Wall Street Journal, and CNN) and international organizations (e.g., 
IMF) in terms of the ‘decoupling thesis’. This asserted that the BRIC economies could 
expand on the basis of their own investment and consumption, despite recession in the USA 
and other advanced economies. Jim O’Neill was reported on Bloomberg as saying that ‘the 
BRIC consumer is going to rescue the world’ (Marinis 2008) and ‘since October 2007, the 
Chinese shopper alone has been contributing more to global GDP growth than the American 
consumer’ (Mellor and Lim 2008). This thesis can be interpreted as a redeployment of the 
technology of identification in which the BRIC engine was seen as a ‘decoupled’ object with 
autonomous consumption power that could save the world from recession. 
 
Reinforcing O’Neill’s contribution, this story was popularized by nodal discursive networks 
of top investment advisors (e.g., Peter Schiff) and fund managers (e.g., Todd Jacobson from 
Lord Abbett) (Shinnick 2008; Lordabett.com 2009) in the mass and Internet media. For 
example, Peter Schiff, author and President of Euro-Pacific Capital Inc, made a strong case 
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that was echoed in many YouTube videos, blogs, articles, and news items. A typical 
statement, from his book, Little Book of Bull Moves in Bear Markets, declared: 
 
"I'm rather fond of the word decoupling, in fact, because it fits two of my favorite 
analogies. The first is that America is no longer the engine of economic growth but 
the caboose. [The second] When China divorces us, the Chinese will keep 100% of 
their property and their factories, use their products themselves, and enjoy a 
dramatically improved lifestyle." (Schiff 2008: 41). 
 
The ‘decoupling thesis’ faced a mixed reception. Some financial analysts, economists and 
international/regional organizations, such as the World Bank and Asia Development Bank, 
noted a contraction rather than decoupling of trade. For example, in April 2008, citing 
reduced exports, the World Bank lowered its China growth forecast to 6.5 per cent. A 
different view was expressed in June 2008, when the IMF released Convergence and 
Decoupling. This study argued that decoupling could co-exist with integration. Globalization 
since 1985 has stimulated greater trade and financial integration and this, in turn, has created 
tighter coupling of business cycles among countries with similar per capita incomes. But it 
also cited historical evidence that some (groups of) countries have decoupled from the 
broader global economy at certain periods.  
 
Despite this mixed reception, the decoupling thesis continued to circulate and resonate. As 
Jim O’Neill himself noted in Newsweek in March 2009: 
 
‘Who said decoupling was dead? The decoupling idea is that, because the BRICs rely 
increasingly on domestic demand, they can continue to boom even if their most 
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important export market, the United States, slows dramatically. The idea came into 
disrepute last fall, when the U.S. market collapse started to spread to the BRICs, but 
there's now lots of evidence that decoupling is alive and well’ (O’Neill 2009). 
 
This was echoed on 21 May 2009 by The Economist magazine in its comment on 
‘Decoupling 2.0’. This updated thesis re-interpreted decoupling as ‘a narrower phenomenon, 
confined to a few of the biggest, and least indebted, emerging economies’, such as China and 
India. These economies purportedly had strong domestic markets and prudent 
macroeconomic policies and also enjoyed growing trade among themselves. Thus the BRIC-
decoupling thesis was limited to China and, to a lesser extent, India. These now became 
‘useful consumers’ thanks to their large foreign exchange reserves, buoyant fiscal positions 
and financial stimulus packages. In November 2009, after its previous pessimistic forecast, 
the World Bank raised its 2010 economic forecast for China’s GDP growth to 8.4 per cent. 
These economies offered ‘hope’ through their solid investment markets, robust consumption 
from their rising middle classes, and relative large stimulus packages (see table 5). 
 
This narrowing of BRIC was reinforced within the policy circuit by Roger Scher in the 
Foreign Policy Blogs Network. Questioning Russian strength, he asked whether the story was 
now ‘From BRIC to BIC … or Even IC??’. Marc Chandler (2009), a prominent foreign 
exchange market analyst with Brown Brothers Harriman, echoed this and suggested 
relabeling the BRIC as CRIB. This foregrounding of China resonated with an earlier view of 
Deutsche Bank Research’s Markus Jaeger, who described China as being ‘in a class of its 
own’ within the BRIC group (2008). 
 




Since late 2008, this revised decoupling thesis has provided the basis for the third moment of 
the BRIC story (see table 1). As the crisis in developed countries deepened and reinforced the 
search for ‘hope’ or objects of recovery, more attention went to the BRIC quartet’s geo-
political significance. Policy makers, international organizations, think tanks, foreign policy 
analysts, etc. warmed to the affective ecological space of the BRIC imaginary (see above). 
Foreign policy rhetoric such as ‘the rising power of BRIC’, ‘emergence of a multipolar world 
order’ and ‘post-American world’ filled policy papers and media reports. These new 
geopolitical imaginaries became more credible when Russia held the first BRIC Leaders’ 
Summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009. This new layer of the BRIC imaginary was enhanced 
by subsequent summits hosted by Brazil, China and India in April 2010, April 2011
6
 and 
March 2012. They operated (partly) as arenas for the BRIC leaders to perform and project 
their capacity as a bloc as well as to discuss their future cooperation in trade, investment and 
finance (despite their differences and competition). 
 
BRIC Summits apart, the IMF and G20 became important sites in which attention turned to 
the recovery potential of BRIC’s lending capacities. For example, at the G20 meeting in 
London in April 2009, the then UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, who was coordinating an 
IMF rescue package for the global economy, called for support from reserve-rich countries 
such as China. In response to demands to diminish the dollar’s international reserve role, a 
new loan mechanism was proposed based on an increased Special Drawing Right (SDR) 
allocation, which amounted to USD 250 billion. To this end, China pledged USD 50 billion, 
and Russia, Brazil and India each promised USD 10 billion. As the debt crisis deepened in 
the Eurozone in 2010, the IMF renewed its call for a firewall against ‘southern contagion’ in 
March 2012. It proposed a Euro bailout fund of USD 430 billion. Risking domestic criticism 
for lending to countries with higher per capita GDP than themselves, China eventually agreed 
18 
 
to contribute USD43 billion and Russia, Brazil and India committed to USD10 billion each in 
June. This was justified as protecting their own economies from contagions as well as gaining 
power in the IMF’s governance structure (e.g., more voting rights, membership in the 
executive broad, inclusion of the Chinese Renminbi in the SDR basket, etc.). 
 
These newly-created lending mechanisms symbolically (re-)affirmed the growing economic 
and political capacity of the BRIC quartet via: (a) the developed economies’ recognition that 
they should be part of the solution to crisis management by subscribing to SDR-denominated 
bonds and bailout funds; (b) their bargaining power in pushing for changes in the IMF’s 
governance structure; and (c) their specific demand for an uplift from 5 to 7 per cent of total 
voting shares in the IMF. Despite these signs of ‘hope’/‘strength’ in making a 
‘multipolar’/‘post-American’ world, some observers questioned whether these new 
arrangements would challenge dollar hegemony (e.g., Kelly 2009) and whether BRIC might 
just become a ‘non-western body …. funnelling money to the west’ (Chardhuri 2012) to 
facilitate the recovery of finance capitalism.  
 
In short, these three overlapping moments of (negotiated) construction of ‘BRIC’ discourses 
and practices (and their continued affective and cognitive reworking) have helped to 
circulate, sediment, and naturalize BRIC as a multi-layered object of ‘hope’. Each moment in 
the development of the BRIC narrative has had performative effects: the BRIC economies 
have graduated from being ‘emerging markets’ to ‘emerging global power’ with new hopes 
invested in them, new practices developed, and new self-identities created. This discursive 
shift illustrates what neo-Foucauldians regard as a technology of agency (Cruikshank 1999), 
based on the coexistence of participation and control, this time, in the international arena (see 
table 1). The BRIC has been encouraged to participate as a ‘we’ in the new ‘multipolar world 
19 
 
order’ but this is associated with efforts to steer the manner of their engagement, e.g., as 
consumption engines, lenders to the IMF, and so forth. They thereby acquire larger roles in 
crisis management especially in the reframing of the post-crisis neoliberal global agendas 
with the BRIC running some symbolic, rather than practical, sideshows such as the creation 
of BRIC local-currency credit lines (Wheatley 2011) and internationalization of the Chinese 
Renminbi without full convertibility. 
 
This three moments in the remaking of the BRIC regime as object of ‘hope’ were 
created/negotiated/circulated by (trans-)national discursive networks (e.g., investment banks, 
economic strategists, think tanks, business journals, political leaders, international 
organizations, etc.). They formulated, prioritized, and sedimented narratives and identities 
(e.g., ‘decoupling thesis’ and ‘IMF lenders’) that drew on the affective energy of capitalism 
as well as rational calculation. Knowledging technologies of identification, achievement, 
investability and agency portrayed BRIC (especially China) as a cathectic object of horizon-
expanding, crisis-transcending hope that opened the prospects of increased returns on 
investment, growing consumer demand, new sources of loans, and even, on these bases, 
global recovery. The making of this hope space is far from a smooth and seamless process. 
The discursive boundary has been constantly challenged and reinterpreted by other actors 
who have emphasized the incoherent, discrepant and even ‘hopeless’ nature of the hegemonic 
BRIC discourse. Some global market strategists and economists asked why some emerging 
economies were excluded (e.g., South Korea) and others included (Russia). Some foreign 
policy analysts question the coherence of the quartet, leading one to use ‘BRIC-à-Brac’ to 
convey their heterogeneous nature (Drezner 2009).
7
 More prosaically, others warned of the 
potential ‘BRIC bubble’ (e.g., Sharma 2012) and one contrarian re-phrased the BRIC 
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acronym as ‘bloody ridiculous investment concept’ (Business Insider 2011), suggesting that 
those who entered this market should abandon hope. 
 
Conversely, at the national level, BRIC discourse has been appropriated to promote new and 
positive collective imaginaries. In India, the discourses of ‘Chindia’ (Ramesh 2005; Sheth 
2007) have been linked to the ‘BRIC’ imaginary since 2005. In Russia and Brazil, official 
BRIC narratives are used to project their images as ‘rising global players’ (e.g., Lula 2011). 
In the Sinophone world, the appropriation of the term ‘BRIC’ is more complicated. It has 
been translated as ‘bricks’ and was reframed, initially by Taiwan’s Business Weekly 
magazine (No. 901-4), as ‘the four golden brick countries’. It appeals to China’s nationalist 
project, which narrates China as a nation regaining international ‘greatness-at-last’ after a 
‘century of humiliation’. The ‘golden’ metaphor helps to signify a ‘shining brick’ eager to re-
enter the world stage. One among many ‘proofs’ is China’s self-narration of it being the 
‘second largest economy in the world’ with large gold and forex reserves that could boost 
global growth.  
 
4. Structural/Material Contexts of the BRIC Discourses and China’s ‘Gold Standard’ 
Stimulus Package 
 
The intensification of the BRIC imaginary is not only a rhetorical process. It is related to the 
widening and deepening of neoliberal financialization since the 1990s in the name of free 
markets and financial innovation. The growth of finance-dominated accumulation fuelled the 
creation of new investment products as well as powerful stock, credit and housing booms that 
ended in crises. Governments in developed countries put together various financial bailouts 
and austerity measures that resulted in further support for the financial industry, more 
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unemployment and threats to society (Crotty 2009). The deep-rooted and contradictory nature 
of this epoch has led to an energetic search for new horizons of action and new objects such 
as BRIC were imagined, especially during the above-noted second and third moments. The 
BRIC economies, notably China, were repeatedly invoked as investment-consumer and, later, 
as lender sites that could alleviate the recession and facilitate global economic recovery. In 
2008, this imagined recovery was made more convincing and materially credible by the 
BRIC governments’ moves to launch stimulus packages according to their domestic 
circumstances and place in the world market. According to ILO country reports (2009a-c), 
China invigorated its economy with a vast infrastructural stimulus package amounting to 
USD 586 billion. India committed USD 9 billion in stimulus and reduced some excise duties. 
Brazil announced a USD 20 billion fiscal stimulus and made cut interest rates several times. 
Russia proposed a USD 62.5 billion Anti-Crisis Programme with numerous measures to 
upgrade its workforce (see table 5). 
 
 
Table 5  BRIC’s Stimulus Packages During the Financial Crisis 2008-9 
 
Country Amount (billion USD) Percentage of GDP 
China 586 15.0 
India 9 0.8 
Brazil 20 1.2 
Russia 62.5 4.1 
 
(Sources: On China (ILO 2009a: 1); on India (Kannan for ILO 2009: 3); on Brazil (ILO 2009b: 2); on Russia 
(ILO 2009c: 2)) 
 
China was seen as the leader in this bloc in terms of the size of its package (15 percent of its 
GDP) both at home and abroad. Domestically, it was intended to maintain its 8 percent 
growth rate as exports and investment fell with the onset of the crisis. Internationally, it was a 
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way to alleviate the global crisis thanks to its ‘fast and vast investment’. When this package 
was announced in the G20 meeting in São Paulo in November 2008, it was widely welcomed. 
For example, it was reported in Reuter that Nicolas Lardy, a China expert and senior fellow at 
the US-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, described it as ‘the gold 
standard on the stimulus package. It was early, large, and well-designed and it’s already 
gotten very substantial results’ (Baldwin 2009). A study by Song (2010) of the New York 
Times’ coverage of the relevant measures between 20 January and 31 March 2009 showed 
that they were depicted as ‘genuine efforts to stimulate the world economy’ and led to a more 
positive reassessment of China’s role in the global community. However, from a CPE 
viewpoint, such positive responses from global players to the stimulus package may not 
match the everyday experience of ordinary people at national or local level in the BRIC 
countries. Concentrating on China, the next section examines how this ‘gold-standard’ 
package intensified some deep-rooted structural tensions within its political economies. 
 
5. China’s Stimulus Package, Land-Based Finance and the Subaltern Groups 
 
With the onset of the financial crisis and economic recession in advanced economies, the 
Chinese central government stimulated its economy by providing support for ten major 
industrial sectors (e.g., steel, shipbuilding, electronics, petrochemical, etc.), building 
infrastructural projects (e.g., high speed rail, electric grids), boosting consumer spending, 
developing the rural economy, and encouraging education and housing. The aim was to 
maintain GDP growth at ‘8 percent’ – a rate that is theoretically the minimum required to 
create enough jobs to maintain social stability as well as show the world that the ‘Chinese 
brick is rising’. Although the stimulus package was well-received at the global level, central-




Based on practices since the late 1990s, central government funded around one third of this 
package; the rest was to come from municipal-local governments, governmental ministries, 
and state-owned enterprises (see table 6). To facilitate this funding, the central government 
loosened its credit policies, and encouraged state-owned banks to lend. When these measures 
were communicated to the ministries and local (including provincial, city, prefecture and 
county) governments, they welcomed this opportunity to get approval for pet projects (e.g., 
high-speed trains and dams) (Naughton 2009). Under the prevailing central-local fiscal 
arrangements, local governments must provide matching funds. This is hard because (a) they 
are expected to channel 60 per cent of their revenue to Beijing; (b) the economic downturn 
reduced business taxes; and (c) they have no formal mandate to borrow money without 
central government approval.
8
 This produced a funding gap. Thus a 2009 National Audit 
Office survey reported that local governments in 18 provinces were failing to provide the 
expected level matching funds, with the poorest performing province sending only 48 per 
cent of the amount due (Xi et al., 2009). 
 
 
Table 6 The Central-Local Government’s Share of the Stimulus Package and  








Major Sources of Finance 
Central 
government 1.2 29.5 
 Direct grants 
 Interest-rate subsidies 
Local 
governments 2.8 70.5 
 Loan-based finance 
– Policy loans 
– Local government bonds issued 
by the central government (around 
200 billion RMB) 
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– Corporate bonds (130 billion 
RMB were issued in Q4 2008) 
– Medium-term notes (25 billion 
RMB were issued in March 2009) 
– Bank loans 
 
 




This shortfall can in principle be filled by financial resources coming from a mix of local 
government bonds issued by the central government (or with its approval), corporate bonds, 
medium-term notes and bank loans (see table 6). However, as China’s bond market is still 
developing, local governments mainly seek their own sources of finance. This article 
concentrates on the increasing commodification of land as a means to generate income. This 
is possible because China’s land leasehold market was formally established in the late 1970s 
under Deng Xiao-Ping. Urban land is state-owned but the separation of ownership and land-
use rights means that public and private actors can shape its disposition and utilization. Urban 
land-use rights could be leased for fixed periods (e.g., 70 years for residential housing) at a 
fee and land-right leases are tradable at auctions. This development encourages local officials 
to acquire arable land for conversion and re-zoning rural towns as urban by compensating (at 
least in principle) the communities involved. In this regard, local governments engage in 
‘land-based finance’. This means that local governments derive extra-budgetary income from 
intensifying land-based commodification. The latter involves acquiring land, developing land, 
selling land use rights, collecting fees, obtaining mortgage loans, and acquiring land again 
(Global Times 2010).
9
 Local governments can thereby generate ’land transfer income’ from 
auctions, land rights licenses, land transfer fees, collateralize mortgage loans, etc. In 2009, it 
accounted for 46 percent of overall financial revenue of local governments compared with 35 
percent in 2001 (Global Times 2010). A complication is that the Budget Law prohibited local 
governments from raising loans directly. So they established government-run financial 
vehicles to borrow from large state-owned banks (e.g., Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank), using land as collateral. Close relations among local governments, their financial 
vehicles and state-owned banks made credit easily available between 2008 and 2010. During 
this period, local government debt rose tenfold from 1 trillion RMB (USD 146 billion) to an 
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estimated 10 trillion RMB (USD 1.7 trillion) (Xinhua 2011). Concurrently, Bank of China 
recorded a profit rate of 28 percent year on year for 2010 (Business Weekly 2011).  
This monopoly use of land (and land use rights) for generating income and loans means that 
local governments, property developers and state-owned banks have strong interests in 
keeping land development active and property prices high. This land-based expansion is 
reinforced by emerging popular socio-economic attitudes that property ownership is a source 
of housing, economic security, hedge against inflation, social status, family safety net and 
personal pride. The business press, media, and peer/family outlooks strengthen these views in 
everyday life. Indeed, sayings such as ‘no car, no house, no bride’ are common among 
women of married age (Offbeat China 2011).The desire for home ownership apart, low 
interest rates and the absence of a national property tax allowed for speculative property to be 
purchased and held relatively cheaply. In short, all these public and private land-based 
calculations have been propelling real estate inflation and fears of a ‘property bubble’ have 
revived since 2009. According to Colliers International, residential prices in 70 large- and 
medium-sized cities across China rose in 2009, with 50 to 60 per cent increases in Beijing 
and Shanghai. Such increases reduce housing affordability with the conventionally calculated 
standard residential property price to average annual family income ratio for Beijing being 
1:22. This compares with UN’s ideal figure between 1:3 and 1:4 (Smith 2010; Powell 2010; 
FlorCruz 2009). 
The inflationary rise of real estate and falling affordability of property have politicized the 
housing question. This was acknowledged by the Premier Wen when he remarked on 27 
February 2010 that ‘property prices have risen too fast’ and this ‘wild horse’ must be tamed. 
The central government leaders introduced regulatory measures in 2010 to dampen the 
market (e.g., tightening of credit, raising deposits for purchase of new land to 50 per cent; 
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restricting the purchase of second and third homes, etc.). However, such stabilization 
measures have moderate effects and property prices continue to rise in some provinces and 
cities. The reasons include: (a) banks find other ways to increase their credit (e.g., selling off 
mortgage loans to state-owned trusts and asset-management companies; turning loans into 
investment products and selling them to private investors, etc.); and (b) local governments 
soften up these property investment restrictions and selectively implement local-level 
initiatives to maintain their land-based mode of accumulation. 
This way of organizing the local political economy does not imply unity of purpose among 
actors. It only means that, for their own particular purposes, they work together at this 
conjuncture. Specifically, this mode of accumulation generates 8 percent (or higher) growth 
rates for the central government, jobs, perks and promotion for local officials; revenue, 
projects and growth statistics for ministries and local governments; profit/investment for 
state-owned banks and state-owned/private property developers;, and, of course, benefits to 
property owners (Sum 2011). Such apparent advantages to central-local elites are not 
matched by benefits elsewhere in the economy and population. Indeed, rising property prices, 
wealth accumulation and regular land auctions co-exist with social unrest related to land grab, 
affordability of housing, the plight of ‘house slaves’, conditions of migrant workers, 
inflationary pressures, and corruption. These sources of unrest destabilize the society and 
have markedly uneven impacts upon the socio-economic positions of ordinary citizens and 
the subaltern groups. The incidence of protests, riots and mass incidents quadrupled between 
2000 and 2010 (Orlik 2011). Given that land grab issues and high-profiled resistance cases 
(e.g., Wukan revolt) are already well-reported in the academic literature (e.g., van Westen 
2011; Jiang 2012) and on the Internet (e.g., Wikipedia, Youtube, etc.),
10
 this article turns to 
two less well-known social issues related to everyday life: the life of ‘house slaves’ and 
plight of migrant workers (and children) in rural towns. 
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First, the life of ‘house slaves’ was reflected and popularized in a TV serial entitled Dwelling 
Narrowness (Snail House) in 2009 (see Image 1). It is based on a novel by Tu Qiao, an 
independent journalist and writer. The story highlights a couple’s struggle to buy an 
apartment in the midst of rising property prices in a fictional city that could well be Shanghai. 
Specifically, the story concerns two sisters who have borrowed heavily to buy user rights to 
an apartment. To obtain the money, one sister begins an affair with a wealthy and corrupt 
official. He later falls from grace because of a scandal over the diversion of pension funds to 
finance property projects (He 2009). The story resonated among ordinary people and social 
critics especially regarding the impact of high property prices upon families and young 
couples, corruption and cronyism in real estate markets, class disparities and the sexual 
economy of mistresses. In spite (or perhaps because) of its popularity, the serial was taken off 
the Beijing TV Youth Channel on 22 November 2009. It was subsequently criticized by the 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television as sensationalizing ‘sex and corruption 
for profit’. Nonetheless, its gritty urban actualism continues to appeal and the serial is still 
available on the Internet and DVD. It has been viewed online and downloaded more than 100 
million times on the Internet (Yu 2011) and government officials admitted to having watched 
it. Like most cultural products, this serial has been interpreted in many ways. One view is that 
it is a piece of social criticism that sharply depicted the painful everyday life of under-paid 
university graduates, ‘stooges of real estate business’ and ‘house slaves’ (Hung 2011: 165). 
For example, it signified a life dominated by numbers - the joy of payday, the pain of saving 
for a flat, and the daily distress of making ends meet. It seems as if these workers do not own 
their dwelling, but their dwelling owns them and dictates their working lives and family 
relationship as if it had enslaved them. The serial supplied material for countless newspaper 
columns, blog and forum discussions as well as appeals for action. Among many responses to 
this depiction, a Xiamen artist, Li Bing, constructed a ‘house slave sculpture’ that portrayed a 
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man standing on his hands while his body was overloaded with many layers of bricks 
(Xiamen News 2010). 
Image 1  Popular Serial on Dwelling Narrowness (Snail House) 2009 
  
(Source: China.org.cn) 
A second, but related, issue is the plight of migrant workers in rural towns on the periphery of 
cities. These workers comprise a significant part of the reserve army of labour that supports 
the Chinese export economy and high growth rates. While low and insecure income and lack 
of household registration entitlements (hukou)
11
 prevent them becoming ‘house slaves’, they 
risk becoming displaced by the same property boom dynamic. This accelerates land clearance 
in rural towns for real estate projects, displaces workers and increases the rent for their 
accommodation. These effects are so rampant that it has triggered rising social unrest related 
to land appropriation, under-compensation for land/property seizure, inflation, corruption, 
etc. Apart from land-based peasant riots, resistance is also expressed through the Internet. An 
unusual and innovative example of everyday resistance emerged in October 2010. A blogger 
called Blood Map used Google Map to chart the distribution of sites where there have been 
land conflicts, use of violence against residents, and people’s resistance to illegal land grab 





Land appropriation and clearance also affect migrant workers, especially their children. 
Migrant families have no hukou in urban areas and some children go to low-fee schools set 
up in slums in these rural towns. These provide inexpensive instruction with support from 
NGOs and community movements. Urban clearance means that this kind of affordable 
education is vanishing due to school closures. In Beijing alone, migrant schools have fallen 
from 320 in 2008 to 180 in mid-2012 (Meng 2012). These schools were categorized by the 
local authorities either as ‘unsafe’ or ‘illegal’ (making them ineligible in both cases for 
compensation on closure). As for the displaced children, a Beijing News survey (2012) 
showed that 53 percent transferred to other migrant-children schools, 33 percent returned to 
home villages (some for schooling), 13.6 percent re-registered at government-run schools, 
and 0.4 percent had parents who had not yet decided what to do. Those re-registered in 
government-run schools often face discrimination from permanent residents who do not want 
their children to have classmates whose parents ‘sell fish or vegetables’. Children who were 
sent back to home villages become ‘left-behind children’ with social concerns related to 
living with aging relatives or in school dormitories. These issues raise more general questions 
about the rights of migrant workers and a hukou system that creates second-class citizens in 
urban areas. Whereas the central government is eager for change; local governments are more 
reluctant because they must foot the welfare bills especially in times of shortfall. 
Nevertheless, some cities (e.g., Shanghai) conducted pilot programmes in 2009 to grant 
‘permanent resident permits’ to migrants. Eligibility is narrowly based on a points system 
related to education, tax payment, criminal record, etc. This creates a stratified citizenship as 
less than 0.1 per cent of migrants qualify (Kong 2010). 
In response to these socio-economic tensions, there are calls to stabilize growth and maintain 
social stability. Responses include controlling property prices by credit restrictions, lowering 
the targeted growth rates to 7.5 percent, and reorienting policies for a social agenda (e.g., 
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housing, education, etc.). However, tightening of credit is hurting local governments (and 
related property interests) as their expansion is largely based on collateralized mortgage loans 
and rising property prices. A credit squeeze means a fiscal crunch for local governments with 
the result that they resort to heavy-handed means of collecting taxes and selectively 
modulating the economic and social agenda according to local priorities. As the global 
financial crisis continues to deepen and the economy experiences slowdown, China, at the 
time of writing (September 2012), is facing more intense struggles between central 
government, local governments and the people (especially the subaltern) over issues related 
to slowing growth, shrinking stimulus package, unemployment, controlling property prices, 
continuing land-based finance, rising social unrest and maintaining stability. 
Although China may have been ‘in a class of its own’ in recent years, the BRIC quartet does 
seem to be proceeding towards slowdown in 2012 with the deepening of the crisis. This poses 
more questions for the well-circulated BRIC investment and the ‘decoupling thesis’. 
Bloomberg reported on 15 June 2012 that O’Neill himself said the situation in China and 
other BRIC members might be ‘more worrisome than the Eurozone crisis’ but he also refused 
to count out the BRIC (just yet). However, the backlash on the BRIC hope is gathering as 
more negative media headlines (e.g., ‘O’Neill’s BRIC risk hitting wall threatening G20 
growth’) appeared. Apart from reimagining BRIC’s future, Goldman and some business press 
are wasting no time to identify new objects of hope: already the MIST bloc (Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) is on the discursive horizon.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This article uses a CPE approach to examine the discursive-material bases of the 
development of the BRIC imaginary since 2001. Partly complementing discussions in 
cultural economy and building on radical political economy and Foucauldian studies of 
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governmentality, CPE seeks to connect the micro-macro aspects of political economy by 
exploring the dialectic of their discursive-material moments, especially as these are created, 
mediated, and circulated through agency and governmental technologies. This has been 
illustrated from the construction of BRIC in three overlapping moments, each of which was 
related to particular material conjunctures - the 9/11 attack, the 2007 financial crisis and its 
repercussions in China. At each conjuncture, diverse set of (trans-)national agents (e.g., 
investment banks, think tanks, international organizations, mass media, etc.) were engaged in 
the making of this imaginary. They are shot through with affective and persuasive energy that 
link, invent, select and circulate BRIC as an object of ‘hope’/‘strength’. They experiment 
with discourses and practices that create a multi-layered discursive space that governs 
individual and collective decisions as well as commonsensical beliefs in the power of BRIC. 
Apart from asking ‘when’ do these discourses gain credence and ‘who’ gets enrolled in 
making this ‘imagined recovery’, a CPE approach also examines ‘how’ questions. These 
include how: (a) these processes have been mediated by a wide range of transnational 
discursive networks; (b) governmental knowledging technologies of power, such as 
identification, achievement, investability and agency, were deployed to create, privilege and 
naturalize the BRIC economies as objects of ‘hope’/‘strength’ in the everyday subjectivities 
of global recovery; and (c) this imagined recovery constructs the BRIC economies as useful 
‘non-western’ consumers and lenders who could drive growth and recovery. However, this is 
more than a rhetorical process as this imagination has been made more credible, materially, 
by the BRIC’s efforts to stimulate their economies. Within the globalized mode of BRIC 
knowing, China is singled out as having a ‘golden standard’ stimulus package in 2008. This 
helped to sustain the global recovery imaginary; but a CPE approach also inquires into the 
nature (the ‘what’) of the struggles and unevenness of this process especially at the national-
local levels. Using China as an illustration, this article noted that this ‘gold standard’ 
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stimulus package has intensified some deep-rooted tensions within central-local relations. It 
gave a central-government green light for local governments to bring forward pet projects. 
Given that these authorities are expected to provide 70% of the fund, land is increasingly 
used to leverage loans and raise revenue. Land sales and property development become 
important investment and speculative activities with consequences such as property bubble, 
forced displacement from land, peasant riots, state terror, dispossession of the already 
vulnerable (e.g., migrant children) and increasing inequalities. Such growing social tensions 
and unevenness characterize, in part, the dark side of the ‘shinning BRIC’ as sites of 
investment, consumption and lending. Within the BRIC, China was seen as leader and its vast 
stimulus package was narrated as important for western recovery and reinvigorated growth. 
However, such ‘hope and energy’ needs to be examined together with the ‘fear and anger’ of 
the subaltern groups at specific sites as well as the energy of (trans-)national networks turning 
up more hope objects such as MIST (i.e., Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey). In this 
regard, A CPE approach aims to offer ideological critiques of hegemonic constructions (e.g., 
BRIC and possibly MIST) based on micro-technologies of power as well as to highlight 
tensions in some local subaltern social sites (e.g., slum schools, and ‘Blood Map’). These are 
often neglected and glossed over in globalized discourses and practices of imagining crisis 
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Endnotes 
1
 Sum (2005; 2011) outlines six discursive-material moments in the remaking of social 
relations. 
2
 In the light of the deepening financial crisis, a fourth moment has emerged: the construction 
of ‘fear’. Apart from worries about China’s and India’s locomotive roles, this mainly 
concerns a feared loss of US competitiveness rooted in ‘innovation deficits’ aggravated by 
rising ‘frugal innovation’ in these countries (see Schmidt 2010). 
3
 For Chaput, affect ‘acts as an energy moving between human beings via communicative 
practices that inspire behaviour instinctively’ (2010: 7; more generally, 7-12). 
4
 These growth ingredients evolved into a measurement tool known as the Growth 
Environment Scores (GES) Indexes by 2005 (for details, see O’Neill 2012).  
5
 For details of these products, see http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/index.html, 
accessed 8
th
 October 2011. 
6
 South Africa was included as the fifth member of the BRIC Summit in 2011 in China.  
7
 Fundamental differences among the BRIC include diverse political systems, and dissimilar 
views on key policy issues such as free trade and energy pricing.   
8
 As local government debts grew, they were allowed to issue bonds from October 2011 until 
June 2012. 
9
 Wang Xiaoying, a researcher in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, described this 
process in 2010 as "acquiring land, selling land, imposing taxes, mortgage and then acquiring 
land again" (see http://www.globaltimes.cn/business/china-economy/2010-12/606958.html, 
accessed 16
th
 August 2012). My account clarifies, builds on, and gives more details. 
10
 Wikipedia includes ‘Protests on Wukan’ (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_of_Wukan) an (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_of_Wukan) and a Google search on 13
th
 a Google 
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search on August 2012 generated 125,000 hits for ‘Wukan Revolt’ on Youtube, international 
media and blog sites.  
11
 Most rural migrants have no hukou in urban areas and no rights to public housing, 
education for their children or local pension and health care benefits. 
12
 For details of the ‘Blood Map’, see ‘Elusive “blood map” founder speaks out’, 
http://observers.france24.com/content/20101119-china-evictions-violence-blood-map-
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